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TOO MANY COOKS SPOIL THE BROTH:
HOW THE TRAGEDY OF THE ANTICOMMONS EMERGES IN ORGANIZATIONS

Abstract
In organizations, conflict often revolves around commons resources because they are critical for
influence, performance, and organizational survival. Research on property rights, territoriality,
and social dilemmas suggests that to reduce such conflict, organizations should facilitate the
(psychological) privatization of commons resources. We complement these three literatures by
drawing from the legal, organizational, and social psychology literatures to model how
psychologically privatizing organizational commons resources – to prevent a tragedy of the
commons (an overuse problem) – can lead to the emergence of equivalently problematic tragedy
in organizations: the tragedy of the anticommons (an underuse problem). Our model contributes
to these literatures by conceptualizing a bottom-up behavioral process (in contrast to institutional
allocation) of property distribution that leads to the emergence of the tragedy of the
anticommons. The implications of this bottom-up behavioral process for property rights theory,
territoriality theory, and the social dilemma paradigm are discussed.

Keywords: anticommons resource, commons resource, egocentrism, fairness, property rights,
psychological ownership, territoriality, tragedy of the commons, tragedy of the anticommons
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Many conflicts in organizational life revolve around a commons resource. A commons is
a shared resource for which access to users is not restricted, and use of the resource subtracts
from the other users’ benefit (Feeny, Berkes, McCay, & Acheson, 1990). As first observed by
Hardin (1968) in his seminal article “The tragedy of the commons”, when many people have the
privilege to use a commons resource and no one user has the right to exclude another, not only is
conflict likely, but tragedies of resource inefficiency and exhaustion emerge. Considering that a
primary goal of any organization is to use resources effectively and efficiently to achieve its
goals (Katz & Kahn, 1978), conflict involving commons resources can pose a significant threat
to an organization’s performance (Bluedorn & Waller, 2006; Gupta & Govindarajan, 1986). To
illustrate an organizational commons, at a small university, a campus-wide intranet for donor
information was created. In the database, each department’s advancement administrators could
retrieve particular donor contact information to then approach and request support. However,
each department’s contact of a donor typically makes that donor less (or un-) able to contribute
to other departments, thereby reducing the intranets benefit to the other departments. Thus it is in
each department’s interest to contact as many donors as possible. The result: a financially
exhausted (and perhaps annoyed) pool of donors reluctant to give in the future (see also Aquino
& Reed, 1998; Ingram & Inman, 1996; Kim & Mahoney, 2002; King, Lenox, & Barnett, 2002;
Kramer, 1991, for additional organizational examples). 1
To resolve (and even avoid) the tragedy of the commons, a variety of solutions have been
proposed (see Kollock, 1998; Kopelman, Weber, & Messick, 2002, for reviews). One popular
solution, suggested by the property rights, territoriality, and social dilemmas literatures is
privatizing the commons resources (e.g., Brown, Lawrence, & Robinson, 2005; Smith, 1981; van
Dijk & Wilke, 1997). Broadly speaking, privatization involves transferring some or all of the
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ownership and/or control of a public resource to private parties – such as individuals, teams, or
departments (Zahra, Ireland, Gutierrez, & Hitt, 2000).
Privatizing a commons is theorized to encourage efficient and effective management of
the commons because, economically, the user incurs not only the benefits of the costs of its
management (e.g., Smith, 1981) and, psychologically, the user has an increased social
responsibility toward their portion of the commons (e.g., van Dijk & Wilke, 1997). Such
privatization occurs through territorial marking and defending behaviors such as policies,
procedures, job descriptions, signs, locks, and passwords (D’Amico & Block, 2007; Kärrholm,
2007). Privatizing behaviors can occur formally by some centralized authority granting legal
ownership or informally through psychological ownership (Brown et al., 2005; Pierce, Kostova,
& Dirks, 2001). The current paper focuses on psychological ownership or “a feeling of
possessiveness and of being psychologically tied to an object” (Pierce et al., 2001: 299). This
focus is made because, as suggested by Nobel Laureate Douglass North’s (1990) seminal work
on property, even when a “leviathan” (or central authority) arbitrates disputes of ownership
(Hobbes, 1907 [1651]), psychological ownership may remain and motivate individuals to follow
informal “rules of the game” about governing the commons that diverge from formal rules.
In maintaining that psychological ownership as an effective solution to the management
of commons resources, the property rights, territoriality, and social dilemma literatures assume
that there is shared understanding among users about governing the commons resource. That is,
users are assumed to agree on who should have the authority to restrict access to and use of the
commons resource. Often however, disagreement arises over who should control what in
organizations (Brown & Robinson, 2011). Even Nobel Laureate Elinor Ostrom’s (1990: 12-13)
seminal work on commons governance suggests that characteristics of the resource and its users
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can make privatization, whether formal or informal, challenging to form and sustain. What
happens when users, left to negotiate the privatization of a commons resource, do not share the
same perceptions about how it should be governed? We maintain that attempting to privatize a
commons resource can lead to the “tragedy of the anticommons” (Heller, 1998).
This paper takes a bottom-up approach and explores how excessive territorial behavior in
organizations transforms a commons resource into an anticommons resource. An anticommons
(Heller, 1998) is a non-substitutable resource over which multiple actors claim rights to restrict
access to the resource and no one has an effective privilege of use. We maintain that individual
actors – be they persons, groups, or departments – with overlapping (psychological) claims to a
commons resource may unintentionally facilitate the emergence of an anticommons resource.
Consequently, overlapping psychological claims obstruct efforts to deploy anticommons
resources in ways valuable to the organization, thereby impairing organizational effectiveness.
Specifically, we propose that (1) resources that are difficult to divide, provide an unequal
distribution of benefits, and have limited carrying capacity along with groups that are large and
differentiated create environments where users experience an egocentric view of fairness and
reactive egoism, (2) an egocentric view of fairness and reactive egoism results in over-marking
and over-defending, territorial behavior, (3) over-marking and over-defending behaviors result in
a commons resource becoming an anticommons resource, and (4) the carrying capacity of the
commons resource moderates the effect territorial behavior has on the likelihood of the
emergence of an anticommons resource.
Our introduction of the tragedy of the anticommons to organization science makes three
main contributions to theory on property rights, territoriality, and social dilemmas. First, a
bottom-up approach to anticommons emergence highlights the role of perceptions when
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attempting to form and enforce property rights, thereby exploring how social dynamics can
impact property rights formation (Eggertsson, 1999). Second, whereas previous territoriality
research focuses on individual outcome variables (Brown et al., 2005; Brown & Robinson,
2011), we examine a potential, social outcome of marking and defending: gridlock of a shared
resource (Heller, 2008). Third, we complement legal scholars and experiment economists topdown approach to the tragedy of the anticommons by examining the psychological foundations
of how anticommons resources emerge in organizations. In doing so, we answer Ostrom’s (1990:
183) call to “further theoretical development … to explain and predict when … [users of a shared
resource] are more likely to self-organize and effectively govern … and when they are more
likely to fail”.

MANAGING COMMONS RESOURCES IN ORGANIZATIONS:
A BRIEF REVIEW AND INTEGRATION
In this section we, first, discuss how various characteristics of shared resources and its
users create complications when attempting resource management. Second, we highlight
integrate findings from the property rights, territoriality, and social dilemma literatures to
introduce the tragedy of the anticommons to organization science.
Characteristics of Resources and Users that Complicate Resource Management
Two general factors are considered when studying a shared resource: resource
complexity and group (or user) complexity (Ostrom, 1990). Both factors can increase uncertainty
surrounding the use of a shared resource, although in different ways. Resource complexity
creates uncertainty surrounding the fairness of distributing and using the shared resource, while
group complexity fosters uncertainty about a user’s willingness to sustain (or exploit) the shared
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resource. Here we review three dimensions of resource complexity and two dimensions of usergroup complexity (henceforth group complexity).
Resource complexity. Shared resources vary in divisibility or the ease of separating the
resource’s benefits among users (Burger, Ostrom, Norsgaard, Policansky, & Goldstein, 2001).
Specifically, some shared resources are difficult to divide or “lumpy” (Taylor & Ward, 1982);
e.g., a commons resource may provide significant benefits to a user only when that individual
utilizes a certain amount of it. Using any amount below this critical mass yields no or very little
benefit. A department may need to tap into a certain number of donors from a shared intranet
before it can justify fundraising events (e.g., gala events) that involve a fixed cost or require
minimum participation. Similarly, a portion of a shared research laboratory may be of little value
to any science team unless their portion contains two microscopes and six computers. When
shared resources are easily divisible, it is easier for individuals to use social heuristics to divide it
and meet their needs (de Kwaadsteniet, van Dijk, Wit, & de Cremer, 2006). For instance, if a
commons resource can be divided easily among six users, then an equal-division rule is often
employed with each individual getting one-sixth (Allison & Messick, 1990). Yet, when shared
resources are not easily divisible, uncertainty arises as to what constitutes an appropriate (Weber,
Kopelman, & Messick, 2004), fair division (Messick, 1993).
A second structural characteristic is the value distribution to users. Often the distribution
of benefits of a resource is not uniform to organizational members. Some individuals value the
resource more (or get more value out of the resource) than others (Northcraft, Neale, Tenbrunsel,
& Thomas, 1996). Consider a group of doctoral students viewed as a shared pool of labor (Rutte,
1990). Even assuming there is a one-to-one ratio of doctoral students to faculty (the shared
resource is easily divisible), some faculty mesh better with some doctoral students compared to
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others, and some faculty have greater overlap in research interests with some students compared
to others. With such asymmetry, distributing this resource’s benefits is challenging. Asymmetric
distributions of benefits are more common than symmetric (Murnighan & King, 1992; van Dijk
& Wilke, 1993), and important because they create increased uncertainty (and subsequent
conflict) about what constitutes appropriate, fair distributions of the resource (Bazerman,
Curhan, Moore, & Valley, 2000; Wade-Benzoni, Tenbrunsel, & Bazerman, 1996).
Third, shared resources vary in carrying capacity (Kollock, 1998). When it becomes
scarce, a shared resource can be used only so much before it is exhausted (Kramer, 1989; Schiff,
1995). Consider Rutte’s (1990) case study of a pharmaceutical laboratory where research
scientists (each seeking to complete independent projects) shared a commons resource pool of
drug analysts. These analysts have a certain number of hours in a day that they may run analyses
on drugs. If the total number of priority requests made by the scientists surpass the analysts’
available time, productivity as a whole suffers. As this commons resource reaches its carrying
capacity, uncertainty over whether others will exercise self-restraint increases (Kramer, 1989).
Individuals who perceive a shared resource as becoming stressed (the carrying capacity is being
reached) aggressively attempt to secure a portion of that resource for themselves (Samuelson &
Messick, 1986).
Group complexity. Users of a shared resource can also vary in complexity. First consider
the group size or number of users. As the number of users increases so does the likelihood of the
shared resource being abused (Hamburger, Guyer, & Fox, 1975; Kollock, 1998). The reasons for
this include (1) there are more users equating to greater total use and faster depletion of the
resource and (2) more potential users increases fear that the resource will not last long (Kramer,
1989). Consequently, individuals may begin using a shared resource up defensively in

8

anticipation that others will offensively exhaust it (Ostrom, Burger, Field, Norgaard, &
Policansky, 1999).
A second characteristic is group differentiation or the “number of distinct subgroups or
decision-making units within a group” (Kramer, 1989: 161). Brewer’s (1979) seminal work on
the minimal intergroup paradigm reminds us that those similar to us are often perceived as more
trustworthy, friendly, and reliable than those perceived as different (see also Brewer & Silver,
1978). In relation to shared resources, Kramer and Brewer (1984) found that when subgroups are
made more salient, in-group favoritism and out-group suspicion strengthens, thereby leading
subgroup members to consume the commons resource faster, fearful that out-group members
will do the same.
In both cases, group size and differentiation enhance an individual’s uncertainty about
others’ behavior about using a shared resource. As uncertainty about others’ behavior increases,
an individual’s tendency to behave self-interestedly (even at another’s expense) increases (Luo,
2007; McCarter, Rockmann, & Northcraft, 2010).
Governing Shared Resources through de Facto Privatization
When individuals consider altering the control over shared property, two methods are
often employed. The first method, advocated originally by Hobbes (1907 [1651]) and later by
Hardin (1968), is using a centralized authority to dictate and enforce the use of the resource.
However, as observed by Crowe (1969) and later by Ostrom (1990), there are be various reasons
for why a central authority would be either impractical or impossible: e.g., incomplete
information may only be available to the authority, the authority may be unable to effectively
monitor and sanction users, and high transaction costs of administration may impede the
authority from operating effectively.
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Alternatively, a second popular remedy, and the focus of the current paper, is
privatization. Ostrom’s (1990) research on commons resource governance observes that allowing
individuals to negotiate rights of ownership can lead to mutual self-enforcing agreements that
circumvent conflict (see also Ostrom, Walker, & Gardner, 1992). Complementing Ostrom’s
observation, three independently developed literatures submit privatizing commons resources
either formally or informally as an efficient solution to the commons resource problem.
Property rights. Property rights are a mechanism for organizing and reducing uncertainty
about what belongs to who and who is responsible for what (Etzioni, 1991; Langlois, 2002). The
economics, organizational economics, and political science domains view property rights as
“social institutions that define or delimit the range of privileges granted to individuals to specific
resources” (Kim & Mahoney, 2002: 226). Social institutions refer to rules used by a collective
and can be developed formally or de facto (Alchian, 1977; Knight, 1998; Ostrom, 1986).
Germane to our discussion, de facto property rights are informal rights that “originate among
resource users” and are socially reinforced – rather than developed and enforced by an
administrator or the state (Schlager & Ostrom, 1992: 254). For instance, users of an intranet
commons may create informal rules (a de facto property rights regime) about the intranet’s use,
independent of administrators’ wishes or legislation.
The property rights literature focuses on how privatization affects incentives (Demsetz,
1967; Gordon, 1954) and how individuals interact with each other (in a proper way [the root of
property]) in relation to an object (Stake, 2004). Privatizing a commons resource – e.g.,
subdividing a commons office area into private offices – internalizes the costs of using the
resource through the right of exclusion and is intended to motivate individuals to effectively
manage their portion of the commons (De Alessi, 2003; Welch, 1983). Cass and Edney (1978),
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for example, found that overusing a commons was less likely under a “private property system”
compared to a “commons property system”. They maintained this was because transforming a
commons resource into a “system of [private] territories” increased an individual’s perceived
responsibility over the resource.
Two insights from property rights theory are germane to our present discussion. First, de
facto property rights regimes may be unilaterally attempted when one party believes that other
parties will validate a rule (de Jasay, 2008). For instance, an individual may attempt to use the
“first possession rule” or “first come, first serve” (Libecap, 2007) to communicate possession of
a resource to others (see also Liliveld, van Dijk, & van Beest, 2008). As illustrated here, conflict
will be avoided assuming there is a shared understanding or socially accepted norm of “first
come, first serve”. Second, property rights can be partitioned: individuals can hold rights over
different aspects of the same resource (Alchian, 1977). Schlager and Ostrom (1992) observed
that property rights may be “bundled” such that, for instance, one individual can access a
commons resource but may not have the right to use (withdraw from) that resource, another can
have withdrawal rights but not the ability to alter how others use the resource, and yet another
individual may have authority to transfer their rights to another but cannot access or withdraw
from the resource. To better understand the significance of bundling property rights, we turn to
the territoriality literature.
Territoriality. Drawing from geography (e.g., Sack, 1986), human ecology (e.g., McCay
& Acheson, 1990), and environmental psychology (Gifford, 1997), organizational behavior
scholars studying territoriality submit that marking and defending resources “creates socially
agreed upon territories” (Brown et al., 2005: 587) and, these behaviors reduce conflict and avoid
exploiting an organization’s resources (Acheson, 1975). Even though initial conflict may arise
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over what belongs to whom, territoriality theory maintains that marking and defending territories
creates a shared understanding that eventually extinguishes conflict (Brown et al., 2005).
Congruent to the property rights literature, the territoriality literature submits that individuals can
attempt to unilaterally control resources (through marking and defending), and conflict may
occur when there is disagreement about what allocation rules are acceptable.
Two forms of territorial behavior relevant to our current discussion are control-oriented
marking and anticipatory defending. Control-oriented marking communicates to others an
individual’s claim over a resource; e.g., this is mine and not yours (Brown et al., 2005). Lobster
fishermen marking buoys with colors to signify their fleet’s “turf” illustrates control-oriented
marking when negotiating the use of a commons lobster bed (Acheson, 1975). Anticipatory
defending involves an individual making it difficult for others to access (or, more generally, use)
a resource in the future (Brown et al., 2005). An individual password protecting a public
computer in an office commons would be an example of anticipatory defending (Brown &
Lawrence, 2011). Both forms of territorial behavior involve one individual attempting to restrict
others’ access and use to a resource.
Two implications from the territoriality literature are relevant to the current paper. First,
individuals mark or defend resources without having actual (legal) ownership of them. An
individual – through using, associating, or investing (time, energy, other private resources) in a
resource – can develop psychological ownership of that resource (Pierce et al., 2001).
Consequentially, an individual expresses ownership and control over that resource through
marking and defending: they do not actually own the resource but act as if they do (Brown &
Robinson, 2007).2 A second insight is that several individuals can perceive that they
psychologically own the same (portion of a) resource. When multiple people perceive they own a
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resource, conflict can occur as these individuals seek to (re-)gain control from intruders (Brown
& Robinson, 2011). Because different individuals may perceive they own a (portion of a)
resource, they may attempt to unilaterally mark and defend, forming de facto property rights,
over the same portions of a commons resource.
Social dilemmas. The social dilemma literature, from social psychology and game
theory, views commons resource management as a take-some dilemma (Dawes, 1980). The takesome dilemma is that, while it is in each individual’s self-interest to take as much of the
commons resource as possible in the short term, if enough choose this strategy, then the
commons becomes overused and everyone is worse off in the long term (Messick & Brewer,
1983). Thus the dilemma is that an individual can and maximize self-interest by not cooperating
(regardless of what others do) but everyone receives a lower payoff if all are non-cooperative
compared to if they were cooperative (Dawes, 1980). Individual rationality leads to group
irrationality in commons resource dilemmas (Dawes & Messick, 2000).
Different from property rights theory, social dilemma theorists maintain that, independent
of altering the payoffs associated with using the commons, altering how its users perceive the
resource context can also lead to effective resource management (e.g., Messick, 1999). Altering
how a situation is perceived (such as how a resource is labeled) changes what rules individuals
deem appropriate when using a resource and, consequentially, can affect commons resource
usage (March, 1994; Weber et al., 2004). van Dijk and Wilke (1997) found that merely changing
the label of a commons resource from “collective property” to “partitioned (private) property”
increased an individual’s perceived social responsibility which then decreased their tendency to
overuse the resource (see Liberman, Samuels, & Ross, 2004, for a similar finding).
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Recently brought to fore in the social dilemma literature is that individuals can perceive
the same situation – such as governing a commons resource – differently (Tenbrunsel &
Northcraft, 2010). Kelley and Thibaut’s (1978) seminal work on interdependent decision making
reminds us that how incentives and behavior are perceived and how they are structured and
related can diverge dramatically. As suggested by recent work on decision frames in social
dilemmas (Northcraft & Tenbrunsel, 2011), non-aligned perceptions about how a resource
should be used create negative effects on commons resource usage. For instance, an individual
may use a commons resource – and believe they do so – quite responsibly, while others see their
behavior as abusive. Connecting social dilemma and territoriality literatures, when an individual
perceives others’ use of a commons resource as inappropriate, that individual may take steps to
preserve their own use of it through marking and defending behavior. The result: escalating
conflict and further stress on the commons resource.
Literature Integration and a Social Dilemma New to Organization Science
Integrating these literatures (property rights, territoriality, and social dilemmas) results in
several insights and an emerging gap. From territoriality research, individuals mark and defend
resources even when they do not technically own (or hold legal property rights over) those
resource (e.g., Brown et al., 2005). From the property rights literature, rights governing a
commons resource can be partitioned: different people can have control over different elements
of the same resource (e.g., Ostrom & Schlager, 1996). The territoriality and property rights
literatures assume there must exist shared understanding among users over how a resource will
be used or who controls access to avoid conflict (Eggertsson, 2003; Greenberg, Rohe, &
Williams, 1982). Relaxing this assumption, social dilemma research suggests that conflict over
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commons resources is a manifestation of mis-aligned perceptions about what is appropriate use
of the commons resource (e.g., Tenbrunsel & Northcraft, 2010).
With these insights in mind, we introduce a social dilemma to the management discipline:
Individuals psychologically owning overlapping portions of a commons resource may mark and
defend those overlapping portions of the commons in attempt to avoid overusing it. However, if
enough individuals mark and defend overlapping portions of a commons resource, the resource
ceases being vulnerable to overuse and becomes subject to underuse. This is because multiple
individuals have means and the motivation to restrict each other from using the resource.
Underused, the resource may no longer provide its full benefit to its users, creating opportunity
costs that negatively affect an organization’s functioning (Porter & van der Linde, 1995).
Such anticommons resources (Heller, 1998), are presumed to exist ex-ante due to illconceived allocation of legal rights, and the existing research on this social dilemma supports
this presumption (Buchanan & Yoon, 2000; van Hiel, Vanneste, & de Cremer, 2008; Ziedonis,
2004). The property rights, territoriality, and social dilemmas literatures, nor organization
science for that matter, consider the psychological antecedents to anticommons formation. The
question remains of how anticommons resources emerge in organizations the first place. To
address this gap we turn to the law and social psychology literatures.

THE EMERGENCE OF THE TRAGEDY OF THE ANTICOMMONS THROUGH SELFSERVING BIASES AND TERRITORIAL BEHAVIOR
This section accomplishes two things. First, we ground the reader in the tragedy of the
anticommons. Second, we integrate this metaphor, based in the law domain, with the social
psychology literature on self-serving biases and the effects of ambiguity to decision making
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understand the psychological foundations of why anticommons resources may emerge through
territorial behavior.
The Tragedy of the Anticommons
Introduced by Heller (1998), the “tragedy of the anticommons” describes a situation
where resources are prone to inefficient underuse because too many owners hold rights (or the
ability) of exclusion. Anticommons resources are, conceptually, mirror images of commons
resources (Heller, 2008). Commons resources face the tragedy of overuse from users not being
able to restrict access (Hardin, 1968), whereas anticommons resources face the tragedy of
underuse from users being able to restrict access (Heller, 1998). Based in the law domain, Heller
(1999, 2008) submits that the way property rights regimes (by a central authority) are designed
and imposed leads to tragic underuse of resources. In the current paper we extend Heller’s
conception of the anticommons by proposing that within organizations, individuals attempt to
create de facto property rights by marking and defending commons resources they
psychologically own. Through this alternative mechanism, anticommons resources emerge in
organizations without the participation of a central authority.
Heller offers two examples of anticommons resources: Russian storefronts and
pharmaceuticals. During the Soviet Union’s transition from a socialist to a market economy,
rights were made alienable in the hope that individual owners would trade them to more
productive use. The problem, however, was that the government distributed rights over resources
to too many people. An example involved upscale stores in Moscow (Heller, 1998), which ended
up in the hands of multiple owners. While one person may have been initially endowed with the
right to sell in a single store, another was endowed with the right to receive sale revenue, and yet
others had the right to lease, to receive lease revenue, to occupy, and determine use. Nobody
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received a standard bundle of rights and the many rights-owners excluded each other from using
a given storefront, which led to both individual and collective inefficiencies. Thus, in posttransition Russia, over-fragmentation of property rights led merchants to sell the influx of
merchandise from the West in flimsy metal kiosks on the sidewalks. Both merchants and
customers shivered through the harsh Moscow winters, when several feet behind them stores that
could provide heat and security lay empty (Heller, 1998). Similarly, over-fragmentation of
intellectual property rights has led to inefficiencies in the U.S. biomedical industry, with
detrimental consequences for the provision of healthcare. Because U.S. patent policy grants
multiple owners rights in fragments of a single gene, each fragment owner can block other
fragment owners from acquiring a coherent bundle of rights in the full-length gene, which is
often necessary for producing the drugs that actually save lives (Heller & Eisenberg, 1998).
As suggested by these examples, Heller (1999) maintains that if individual’s block
enough of a shared resource it may become unusable. This is similar to social dilemma and
territoriality theories that predict if enough individuals act self-interestedly in having a resource
meet their needs in the short term that the resource can cease giving any benefits or meeting
anyone’s needs in the long term (Brown et al., 2005; Taylor & Ward, 1982). Extending this idea,
we submit that if enough individuals mark and defend (portions of) a commons resource to meet
their needs in the short term that an anticommons resource may emerge being underused in the
long term. Returning to the donor intranet database example, the university sought to navigate
the overuse of the donor commons by allowing advancement administrators to mark particular
donors as “taken” or not approachable for later use. This was done by either making notes by the
donor’s name or limiting the contact and personal information about the donor. Conflicts arose
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when several departments viewed a donor as “theirs” and these departments restricted each
other’s access to the donor’s information. The intranet to this day is frozen and left unused.
Top-down and bottom-up approaches. Heller’s (1998, 1999, 2008, 2011) work primarily
takes a top-down approach to anticommons resources emergence and uses examples where
central authorities (e.g., the government) arrange formal property rights in such a way that
(perhaps unintentionally) creates anticommons resources. This top-down approach offers one
explanation for anticommons emergence: the structure of formal property rights by a central
authority creates excessive information (or transaction) costs (Williamson, 1979) associated with
coordinating usage of a shared resource, resulting in that resource being underutilized (Heller,
1998; Heller & Eisenberg, 1998). Maurer’s (2006) study of the failed attempt to create a
worldwide human mutations database supports this top-down explanation: the number of
organizations involved and uncertainty surrounding the costs and benefits of the database created
excessive information costs “deadlocking” negotiations over the database’s creation.
We take a bottom-up approach to anticommons emergence. Heller speculates that
anticommons resources can be exacerbated by individuals falling victim to psychological biases
(e.g. over-valuing a fragment of property they [perceive to] own), leading them to actions (overpricing or hold-ups) that unintentionally continue to lock-up a resource (e.g., Heller & Eisenberg,
1998). However, the psychological and behavioral antecedents of the anticommons resources is
hitherto unexplored academic territory. Integrating the three literatures on (psychological)
privatization with the social psychology literature on self-serving biases assists in understanding
how and why anticommons resources behaviorally emerge from the bottom up.
Self-serving Biases
Notions of fairness are central to conflicts about resource distribution (Deutsch, 1975).
We view fairness as involving an individual comparing how much of a resource they control
18

relative to others. This comparison influences an individual’s satisfaction with the outcome
(Messick & Sentis, 1983). Fairness is at the heart of conflict over commons resources (Baland &
Platteau, 1999). Property rights and the social dilemma literatures identify fairness of outcomes
(or distributive justice) as a mechanism explaining how much of a commons resource an
individual may unilaterally attempt to take or leave to another (Fahr & Irlenbusch, 2000;
Hoffman & Spitzer, 1985). Although suggested to explain how resources are marked and
protected, fairness has received less attention among territoriality scholars (Murphy, 1990).
Integrating concepts of territoriality to fairness judgments, individuals may mark and defend
portions of a commons resource as a function of what they perceive is their “fair share” of that
resource.
Fairness is a perception prone to self-serving biases (Messick & Sentis, 1979) and
suspicion (Messick & Sentis, 1983). It is easier for an individual to recall, access, and process
their own needs, contributions, preferences, and interests compared to doing the same for others’
(Babcock & Loewenstein, 1997). After an individual retrieves information, information favoring
one’s own interests is found to be given greater weight compared to others’ (Babcock,
Loewenstein, Issacharoff, & Camerer, 1995). Because information access, retrieval, and
processing are skewed to favor oneself, it is easier to justify resources being allocated in one’s
favor. Consequently, individuals often make fairness judgments through an egocentric view of
fairness: fairness judgments that favor one’s self as compared to others (Paese & Yonker, 2001).
Indeed self-serving recall, access, and processing of information explain why individuals often
experience conflict and subsequent impasse when negotiating the distributing limited resources
(Thompson & Loewenstein, 1992).
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In addition to making fairness judgments egocentrically, we often believe we are fairer
and more cooperative than others (Krueger & Acevedo, 2007; Messick, Bloom, Boldizar, &
Samuelson, 1985). As a result, while considering others’ needs, contributions, preferences and
interests when allocating resources, we become suspicious that others will be unfair to (and take
advantage of) us (Epley, Caruso, & Bazerman, 2006). Reactively, we take steps to protect
ourselves from others’ opportunism (Rockmann & Northcraft, 2008). This “self-serving behavior
in reaction to the [perceived] egoistic behavior of others” is termed reactive egoism and explains
why individuals overharvest a commons resource when they think about what others will do
(Epley et al., 2006: 873). Thus, whereas an egocentric view of fairness is an offensive bias,
reactive egocentrism is a defensive bias.
Considering that previous research on commons resources finds that egocentric views of
fairness affect harvesting (or take) behavior (resource-use), we submit that such views can also
affect territorial marking and defending behavior. An individual, perceiving to own a (portion of
a) commons resource, may mark that portion to communicate control. Further, being suspicious
about others attempting to breach the territory and use that portion, that individual may
defensively engage in anticipatory defending. However, because of the tendency to make
fairness judgments egocentrically, individuals may territorially mark and defend more of a
commons resource than is perceived as fair by others. Indeed, individuals are motivated to avoid
accepting outcomes imposed by others that they perceive as being unfair (Loewenstein,
Thompson, & Bazerman, 1989). Reactively, users observing perceived unfair (or over) marking
and defending (portions) of a commons resource may also begin to (over) mark and defend
portions of the commons resource, creating an anticommons resource.
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The Role of Ambiguity in Self-serving Biases
Self-serving biases are fueled by uncertainty (Blader, 2007; Smith, 1987). As the criteria
to a decision become more objective (or more certain), it becomes increasingly challenging for
an individual to favor some pieces of information while discounting others (Felson, 1981). A
situational characteristic that is the linchpin of self-serving biases is ambiguity or, in relation to
our discussion, uncertainty about what constitutes a fair distribution of a commons resource and
how others will behave (Wade-Benzoni et al., 1996).
Messick (1993) submits that any social heuristic – for instance equity (or equality)
judgments – is selected and used by an individual as a function of the ambiguity of the situation.
Experimental research on negotiation (Thompson & Loewenstein, 1992) and social dilemmas
(Wade-Benzoni et al., 1996) find that egocentric views of fairness abound in the presence of
ambiguity and result in outcomes that are in no party’s interest: individuals attempt to consume
more of a resource than what is perceived by others as fair. We submit that any factor increasing
ambiguity about what constitutes the fair (psychological) privatization of a commons resource
can lead to offensive, non-cooperative behavior in the form of control-oriented marking.
Ambiguity has a similar affect on reactive egoism. Epley and Caruso’s (2009) review of
perspective taking suggests that when there is uncertainty about others intentions and behavior in
interdependent decision making tasks (such as commons resource governance) that individuals
become less cooperative compared to when uncertainty is low. Caruso, Epley, and Bazerman
(2007) found that when individuals preface their own decision with focusing on the uncertainty
surrounding their partner’s likelihood of cooperating in a prisoners’ dilemma they are less likely
to cooperate. Thus, factors that increase (or even highlight the) ambiguity surrounding what
others will do can lead to defensive, non-cooperative behavior. Here we examine the territorial
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behavior of anticipatory defending as a non-cooperative behavior that leads to anticommons
resource emergence. In the next section we draw from group decision making and negotiation
literatures to propose two factors that increase ambiguity.

A MODEL OF ANTICOMMONS RESOURCE EMERGENCE
This section presents a model about how anticommons resources emerge when
individuals rationally seek to psychologically privatize a commons resource. We maintain that
certain characteristics of the commons resource, as well as the group, lead to ambiguity
surrounding what constitutes a fair resource distribution. This ambiguity increases the likelihood
that individuals will be susceptible to viewing the distribution of the resource through the selfserving biases of egocentric interpretation of fairness and reactive egoism. Viewing the
governance of the commons resource egocentrically, individuals will be inclined to over-mark
and over-defend their psychologically owned portion of the commons. As more of the commons
resource becomes marked and defended, an anticommons resource is more likely to emerge. The
carrying capacity of the commons resource moderates the relationship between territorial
behavior and anticommons resource emergence. These relationships are outlined in Figure 1.
-------------------------------------------------------INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE
-------------------------------------------------------Several assumptions are necessary before proceeding. We assume the individuals
involved psychologically own (portions) of the commons resource. Psychological ownership can
emerge through an individual using a resource, associating (or identifying) with a resource, or
investing private resources into the development or maintenance of that resource (Pierce et al.,
2001). Second, we assume that individuals do not share perceptions about what constitutes the
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appropriate form of commons governance (Weber et al., 2004). Lastly, we assume that the
organizational authority (which most organizations have) will not step in to adjust and enforce
property rights involving the commons. This last assumption can be for a variety of reasons, as
reviewed by Ostrom (1990: 8-12).
Resource Complexity and Egocentric Views of Fairness
The complexity of the commons resource impacts the degree of egocentric view of
fairness experienced by individuals. In particular as a shared resource becomes more difficult to
subdivide, ambiguity arises as to what constitutes its fair distribution (Budescu, Rapoport, &
Suleiman, 1990; Messick, 1993). Lumpy resources – such as an office commons with one
computer and three users – cannot be easily parceled: some are left with more than others
(Taylor & Ward, 1982). Such cases increase ambiguity regarding which decisions rule is
appropriate (Weber et al., 2004); e.g., should computer access be a function of employee tenure,
workload, or skill? Without clarity of appropriateness, individuals are susceptible to egocentric
views of fairness (de Kwaadsteniet, van Dijk, Wit, de Cremer, & de Rooij, 2007) as an
individual finds it cognitively easier to access, retrieve, and process positive information about
the situation that favors self-interests (Babcock & Loewenstein, 1997). Thus,
Proposition 1a: Individuals will experience egocentric view of fairness when the
difficulty in dividing the resource is high compared to when it is low.
Proposition 1b: Individuals will experience egocentric view of fairness when the
distribution of benefits across potential resource users is unequal compared to when it is
equal.
Group Structure and Reactive Egoism
The structure of the group using the commons resource influences the tendency for an
individual to react egocentrically to other users. As the number of users of a commons resource
increases, so does the uncertainty about what those users will do with that resource (Messick &
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Rutte, 1992). Indeed, social dilemma research in political science (Marinoff, 1999) and
organization science (McCarter, Rockmann, & Northcraft, 2010) suggests that as group size
increases, individuals become more concerned with what others will do. Similarly, groups that
are fractured into subgroups experience greater competition among subgroups over using a
commons resource (Kramer & Brewer, 1984). This is because in-group members (those
perceiving to belong to one subgroup) favor their own members while being uncertain about the
intentions of out-group members (Brewer & Silver, 1978) and possibly become more
competitive with those groups (Bornstein & Ben-Yossef, 1994). Thus,
Proposition 2a: Individuals will experience reactive egoism when the number of potential
users of a commons resource is large compared to when it is small.
Proposition 2b: Individuals will experience reactive egoism when group differentiation is
high compared to when it is low.
Self-serving Biases and Territorial Behavior
The self-serving biases, egocentric views of fairness and reactive egoism, lead to overmarking and over-defending of portions of a commons resource. When individuals
psychologically own an object, and when there is uncertainty surrounding what should “belong”
to whom, they express that ownership through control-oriented marking (Brown et al., 2005).
However, if it becomes difficult to determine a fair distribution of a resource, it becomes easier
for individuals to access, retrieve and process information that supports their own interests and
needs compared to attempting to do the same for others (Messick & Sentis, 1983). Merging these
ideas from egocentrism and territoriality, when there is uncertainty about what constitutes a fair
distribution of a commons resource, individuals, psychologically owning that resource, will
interpret its distribution egocentrically and over-mark. Furthermore, if they anticipate that others
will not be as cooperative and fair as they perceive themselves to be in respecting their marked
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territory (Messick et al., 1985), then individuals may over-defend a territory through anticipatory
defenses. Thus, based on these proposed relationships, we offer the following three propositions:
Proposition 3a: Egocentric views of fairness will be positively related to over-marking,
territorial behaviors.
Proposition 3b: Reactive egoism will be positively related to over-defending, territorial
behaviors.
Proposition 3c: Egocentric views of fairness and reactive egoism will mediate the
relationship between resource complexity and group structure and territorial behavior.
Territorial Behavior and Anticommons Emergence
Furthermore, we maintain that over-marking and over-defending behaviors transform a
commons resource into an anticommons resource. Property rights theory and territoriality theory
reminds us that individuals can perceive to own the same (or overlapping) portions of the same
resource (Alchian, 1977; Brown et al., 2005). The more individuals mark and defend portions of
a commons resource, the more challenging it becomes for others to access and use the resource.
This marking and defending can be exacerbated because individuals may perceive they either
deserve to control more the resource or fear that others will be greedy when marking and
defending a territory. As a result, access to the commons resource is excessively limited,
becoming an anticommons resource. Thus,
Proposition 4: As over-marking and over-defending behavior increases, the likelihood of
an anticommons resource emerging increases.
The Moderating Effect of Carrying Capacity
The carrying capacity of the commons resource will moderate the impact over-marking
and over-defending behaviors have on anticommons resource emergence. If the commons
resource is scarce, it may take little marking and defending portions of the commons resource
before it becomes no longer useable. In contrast, where there is a bounty of a commons resource
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available, even individuals marking and defending, what is perceived as, more than their fair
share will be less likely to lock up the resource. Thus,
Proposition 5: The carrying capacity of the commons resource will moderate the
relationship between territorial marking and the emergence of an anticommons resource
such that the likelihood of territorial behavior leading to anticommons resource
emergence will be greater when the carrying capacity of the commons resource is low
compared to when it is high.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
The current paper integrates three independently developed literatures of privatization –
i.e., property rights, territoriality, and social dilemma literatures – with law and social
psychology literatures on anticommons resources and self-serving biases to introduce a social
dilemma of privatization to organization science: Individuals may come to psychologically own
overlapping portions of a commons resource, mark and defend those overlapping portions, and
transform a commons resource into an anticommons resource. In doing so, the resource ceases
being vulnerable to overuse and becomes subject to underuse. This is because multiple
individuals have means and motive to restrict each other from using the resource. We proposed
that resource complexity and group structure can create ambiguity about commons resource
governance. This ambiguity makes individuals susceptible to the self-serving biases of
egocentric views of fairness and reactive egoism, resulting in over-marking and over-defending a
commons resource to the point of it becoming an anticommons resource.
A bottom-up approach to anticommons emergence pushes our understanding of
ownership in several ways. First, consider the social dilemma of privatization while navigating
the tragedy of the commons. Individuals, seeking to manage a shared resource and avoid overuse
(an inefficient outcome), may take action leading to its underuse – still an inefficient outcome
(Mukhija, 2005). This social dilemma has particular importance to managers who may encourage
subordinates to psychologically own their work, in hope increase work morale, output, and
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accountability (e.g., Vandewalle, Van Dyne, & Kostova, 1995). If the perceive-to-be owned
resource is shared then what is rational for the individual can become irrational for the
organization.
Theorizing how territorial behaviors lead to an emergence of anticommons resources
highlights the importance of interdependence when multiple individuals perceive they own
(portions of) the same resource. Our model focuses on how one individual’s territorial behavior
not only impacts how they use a commons resource, but also how others use it. In discussing the
consequences of territoriality in organizations, Brown’s research on territoriality primarily focus
on individual outcomes – such as individual commitment, desire to be isolated from others, and
preoccupation (Brown et al., 2005; Brown & Robinson, 2011). The current paper complements
Brown et al.’s (2005: 587) theorizing by looking closer into what can happen when “territorial
behavior … [does not] create socially agreed upon territories”: the interdependence experienced
among users of a commons resource creates an environment where one’s territorial behavior
results in a resource being underutilized by others.
Interdependence also plays a role in how an individual perceives another’s territorial
behavior. Tenbrunsel and Northcraft’s (2010) research on perceptions in social dilemmas
suggests that individuals may intentionally mark and defend a territory to be a wise steward over
what is (perceived as) theirs while unintentionally coming across to others as non-cooperative.
The result of this unintentional cooperation is encouragement of others to also be noncooperative when using the commons. Ironically, while we tend to consider privatization as
means of independence, the current paper shows how privatization can strengthen
interdependence (McWilliams, 2011). However, whether those unintentionally creating the
anticommons are aware of their interdependence is a different question. Individuals will sacrifice
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personal welfare to avoid a social burden when they believe that they are (even partially) the
cause of the crisis compared to when they are not (Kahneman, Ritov, Jacowitz, & Grant, 1993).
Future research may benefit from examining whether the creation of the anticommons can be
averted as a function of whether (or not) the creators of it are aware of their shared fate.
Eggertsson (1999) observed that little weight is given to the social processes influencing
property rights formation. The current paper shows how “psychological property rights” (van
den Bergh, 2007) can emerge over a commons resource and, because of self-serving biases – i.e.,
reactive egoism and egocentric views of fairness – these psychological, de facto property rights
regimes can turn a commons resource into an anticommons resource. Whereas previous property
rights research focuses on how incentives lead to property right formation (e.g., Alchian, 1977;
Demsetz, 1967; Hart & Moore, 1990), the current paper brings the role of perceptions into the
five decade-long discussion of property rights scholarship. This refocus on perceptions
encourages property rights theorists to consider how incentives to (psychologically) privatize not
only alter the payoffs of a decision but also how the decision maker’s behavior is perceived and
responded to by other decision makers. Individuals may be merely responding rationally to
incentives to mark and defend portions of a commons resource that they perceive as theirs, while
being perceived by others as being irrational and inappropriate.
The current paper also complements existing social dilemma research. Previous work
assumes the only action available to individuals using commons resources is harvesting (Dawes,
1980; Kopelman et al., 2002). We extend this thinking by discussing how territorial behavior
over a commons resource can keep others from harvesting. However, doing so creates a secondorder social dilemma. To avoid the tragedy of the commons, it is in each individual’s selfinterest to mark and defend portions of the commons resource that they psychologically own.

28

However if too much of the resource is psychologically privatized, the outcome is in no one’s
interests: a tragedy of the anticommons emerges. Thus whereas previous research maintains that
perceiving to be an owner over portions of a commons resource improves the collectives wellbeing (e.g., Cass & Edney, 1978; van Dijk & Wilke, 1995), we observe that perceived ownership
may backfire when we arm users with the ability to restrict (or at least impede) access.
Further, we extend the burgeoning work on the anticommons by explicating how the
suspected “psychological biases” lead to anticommons emergence (Heller, 1998, 2008). Whereas
the majority of the literature assumes the anticommons’ existence ex ante (e.g., Buchanan &
Yoon, 2000; van Hiel et al., 2008; Ziedonis, 2004), the current paper shifts focus to how this
troubling resource comes into being. A bottom-up approach pushes the discussion of
anticommons – predominantly among legal scholars – from market situations where formal
authorities (e.g., the state) create anticommons resources using de jure property rights regimes, to
organizational situations where individuals use de facto property regimes to create an
anticommons resource out of a commons resource.
In discussing how psychological biases enhance the likelihood of anticommons
emergence, our approach suggests an alternative for how to navigate anticommons resource
dilemmas. Whereas Heller (2008) would advocate legislation to alter the incentives and structure
of property rights, our model suggests that creating shared logics (Messick, 1999) about
appropriate commons governance could avoid an anticommons resource from emerging. This
latter strategy may be particularly attractive for organizations that value decentralized control
and a meditational approach to resolving employee disputes (Feldman & Khademian, 2000).
An English proverb states that “too many cooks can spoil the broth”, implying that too
many people involved in the same task (resource) reduces the chances of that task (resource)
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being achieved (Ammer, 2006: 446). We theorize how too many territories can spoil a commons
resource by transforming it into an anticommons resource. Privatizing a commons resource can
be an effective way to navigate a tragedy of overuse but only when either there is a “leviathan”
to dictate and enforce rules (Hobbes, 1907 [1651]) or an agreed upon set of appropriate rules
(March, 1994). Absent of the former, and individuals may seek to manage a commons resource
through territorial behavior. Absent of the latter, and individual territorial behavior leads to an
outcome unfortunate for everyone: a tragedy of the anticommons.

Footnotes
1

This donor intranet vignette, which will be elaborated upon throughout the current paper,

actually occurred at several of the authors’ institutions.
2

Territoriality theory complements property rights theory when it comes to ownership. The

property rights literature assumes that ownership cannot exist with there being a socially agreed
upon regime of rules defining relationships among people who use things (e.g., ideas, land,
objects). Ownership does not occur until individuals agree on user rights associated with
property (e.g., Stake, 2004). In organization science, territoriality theory rests on the concept of
psychological ownership, a perception and feeling of ownership that translates to an individual
behavior as if that person does own something, but really does not (e.g., Brown et al., 2005).
Thus, the territoriality theorist does not presume social agreement for to talk about ownership,
unlike the property rights theorist. Considering we are focusing on psychological ownership, we
shall use the word ownership as a territoriality theorist would.
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